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A Wherk Differen Baligae
Ticket ScaRping Legislation and
Behavioral Economics?
By Jasmin Yang'
B aseball is the sport most closely
intertwined with American culture.' In many
ways, the scandals associated with baseball, such
as antitrust, segregation, and labor disputes,
parallel and reflect the nation's development. In
helping to shape the nation's collective identity,
baseball's history is a sentimental reminder of a
time when people were less concerned with
profit and more interested in democratic access.
And despite its somewhat tarnished image, many
people want to champion and maintain the
purity of the game.
In jarring contrast, ticket scalpers
personify the intersection of America's love for
baseball with its love of profit. They represent
pure free-market behavior and unbridled
capitalism. For many scalpers, the concepts of
face value and democratic access are meaningless.
One ticket scalper recounted his best sale:
I'll tell you the best night ever.. .Willie
Mays Night at Shea Stadium, 1973. They
had a box office release of 5,000 tickets
right before the game. They were two-
dollar tickets, and the public never saw
them. Scalpers bought them all up for
50 cents over face, and we were selling
them for twenties. Great night.2
Ticket scalping and baseball, America's
"national pastime," have had a thorny relationship.
On the one hand, baseball's history and cultural
relevance lead many to believe that the sport
should be democratically accessible. On the other
hand, ticket scalpers and brokers have been able
to capitalize immensely on fans' devotion by selling
tickets in excess of their face value. Ticket scalpers
and fans have a somewhat circular relationship.
Opponents of scalping charge that the practice
is exploitative and seek regulation or prohibition.
Scalpers and brokers counter that they operate
within the free market and exist as a result of
fans' desire to attend games. As one ticket broker
has put it:"[i]t wouldn't be here if people didn't
want it, so there is a need for it."
3
Ticket scalping is defined as "the reselling
of tickets to popular entertainment or sporting
events at whatever price the market will bear."4
Ticket scalping often happens when fans are unable
to attend events for which they have tickets, while
other fans want to attend the events after face-
value tickets are no longer available. This secondary
ticket resale market continues to thrive. In spite
of ethically neutral market principles that dictate
that popular tickets will be sold at higher prices
(usually in excess of face value), in general, "the lay
public does not share this indifference "'
As a response to the public's general
disfavor towards ticket scalping, many states have
statutes that regulate or limit the activity ranging
from controlling or prohibiting the resale of tickets,
outlawing scalping near stadiums, and only allowing
licensed ticket brokers to resell tickets above face
value.6 Courts uphold legislation that regulates
ticket scalping, recognizing that states protect the
welfare of the public's access to the free market
by having a "legitimate interest in ensuring public
access to entertainment and sports events."7
The Chicago Cubs became the target of
criticism after some fans filed a class-action lawsuit
against the club's ticket-brokerage operation.
8
After scalpers resold their tickets for massive
profits, the Cubs decided to start their own
brokerage.9 While the Illinois Ticket-Scalping Act
prohibits actual baseball teams from selling tickets
above face value, the Act allows licensed ticket
brokers who meet certain licensing requirements
to sell tickets for profit.'0 The Cubs maintained
that their ticket brokerage is an associated, but
separate, entity from the ball club. Fans
nonetheless alleged that the ticket brokerage and
SPORTS
ball club were essentially the same entity, claiming
that the Cubs themselves were selling tickets in
violation of the statute."
Both fans and other ticket brokers criticized
the club's decision to form its own ticket brokerage.
The Cubs' situation is unique in that it aligns the fans
with the ticket brokers who profit from them in
opposition to the club's ticket brokerage.
The Cubs' situation is uni
aligns the fans with the t
who profit from them in c
the club's ticket brokerag
In examining the Chicago Cubs' situation,
this note seeks to explore why anti-scalping
legislation exists, thereby preventing free-market
economic principles from determining the price
of event tickets. From a behavioral economics
perspective, the negative public reaction to ticket
scalping is a response to a perceived notion of
fairness - that the face value of a ticket is actually
the "fair value." 2 In viewing the face value of tickets
as the fair value, the background notion of fairness
is a force that drives ticket scalping legislation.
Next, this note discusses why the Chicago
Cubs' case inspires more vehement criticism than
is usual for ticket scalping. The case strikes fans as
more unfair than ordinary ticket scalping because
of the close association the brokerage has with the
ball club. By setting up a brokerage, the Cubs have
shattered the perception that the secondary ticket-
resale market is a free market.' Fans and other
ticket brokers no longer believe that there is an even
playing field since the Cubs have far more information
and access to the tickets than any other party. Fans
believe that the Cubs withhold tickets that could be
sold at face value and divert them to the brokerage,
thereby shortening the supply of tickets and forcing
fans to turn to the secondary ticket market. Brokers
criticize the Cubs' brokerage because the Cubs
organization controls the distribution of the tickets
and engages in an unfair practice by using its
distribution, control, and additional information to
exert substantial influence over the secondary ticket
market. 4 Though the Cubs organization prevailed
in court, the public did not buy its defense that it is
just another ticket broker."
This note then examines other ways in which
ball clubs have attempted to maximize the revenue
they receive off ticket sales. If one views face value
prices as below-market prices, since ticket brokers
are able to extract prices in excess of face value
from fans, then clubs
could conceivably
decrease the activity
que in that it of the secondary
market by gauging
icket brokers more accurately the
price that fans are
)ppOSilon to willing to pay in the
2primary market
(from ball club to
consumer). Ball try to
do this by instituting
variable ticket pricing
mechanisms, charging more for premium games (e.g.,
weekend games, games in the summer, and games
against popular opponents).' 6 The Seattle Mariners
experimented with another method for three
games. They held an online auction, allowing fans to
determine the market price of baseball tickets. 7
Lastly, recognizing that the secondary ticket
market will likely continue to thrive in spite of ball
clubs' efforts to determine consumers' value for
tickets, ball clubs could minimize the profits gained
by scalpers, and help ensure affordable public access
to events. They could lobby for legislation that
prohibits teams from starting their own affiliated
ticket brokerages and limit scalpers and brokers to
discrete areas. The Phoenix Suns supported an
ordinance, for example, that limits scalping activity
to a discrete area across from the basketball arena,
decreasing scalpers' profits.'8 The scalpers'
centralized location fosters a more open market,
enabling fans to compare prices and pay less for
tickets.
Baseball's best method of balancing increased
revenue with the fans' interest in affordable access
to games may be a combination of more accurately
gauging the value fans place on tickets and regulating
the secondary ticket market to prevent fans from
paying overly exploitative prices.
A Whole Different Baligame
Lo 'The Choucigo Cubs
L.% o u O H'kxtc~
In 2002, the Chicago Cubs organization
found itself embroiled in a courtroom battle over
the legality of its ticket brokerage service. After
watching ticket brokers and ticket scalpers make
huge profits off the sales of Cubs tickets, the
organization decided to join in the secondary ticket
market itself. Cubs' vice president for business
operations, Mark McGuire, stated,"[t]he secondary
market is going to continue whether we are in it or
not....We are going to be as creative as we can in
developing our business." 9 In response, in June
2002, the Cubs set up Wrigley Field Premium Ticket
Services, Inc.
("Premium"), a
D e I a w a r e -
incorporated licensed
ticket brokerage 6Cubs f
located at 3717
North Clark Street, the clul
just down the street
from the ballpark.20 In
selling tickets for
more than face value 1
(the most extreme trom tf
example being $1,500
for a $45 face-value
ticket), the club stated
that Premium is a
licensed ticket broker whose tickets are available
on the resale market.2 '
McGuire, also the president of Premium,
explained that the ticket brokerage acts as a service
and as "a market of Cubs fans who will not buy tickets
months in advance for games they want to see.
Rather, they will wait until two weeks before the
game, search for tickets and pay big money for
them. '22 By providing this service, says McGuire,
Premium offers a superior product to other ticket
brokers or scalpers since Premium's affiliation with
the Cubs is a guarantee of the tickets' authenticity.
23
However, Cubs fans disagree with the club
as to whether Premium actually benefits from them.
On October 9, 2002, Cubs fans filed a class-action
lawsuit against the ball club (Chicago National League
Ball Club, Inc.) and Premium, charging them with
violations of the Illinois' Anti-Scalping Act ("Ticket
Scalping Act"), Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, and the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.24 Cubs fans Gerald Carr Jr.
and Peter John Cavoto, Jr., who purchased $36 Cubs
tickets from Premium for prices between $50 to
$130, spearheaded the litigation." The proponents
of the lawsuit demanded that Premium reimburse
purchasers $ 100 for each ticket that fans purchased,
which is the maximum statutory remedy for
violations of theTicket ScalpingAct.26 The suit went
to trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois
before Judge Sophia Hall on August 12, 2003. She
issued a ruling on November 24, 2003.27 Judge Hall
concluded that the defendants did not violate the
Ticket Scalping Act and that Premium qualified as a
licensed ticket broker despite its connection with
the Cubs organization.
28
Section one of the Illinois Ticket Scalping
Act prohibits owners and operators of ballparks
from directly selling baseball tickets in excess of
face value.29 It also prevents owners and operators
from selling tickets outside of the box office or the
premises of the ballpark unless the owners and
operators offer the tickets at the outside location
for the face-value of the tickets "at the same
advertised price or printed rate thereof." Judge
Hall noted that "the Ticket Scalping Act prohibits
owners of amusements, such as Ball Club[s], from
selling tickets above the advertised and printed
price on the tickets."3
Additionally, the next section of the statute
states:
ans disagree with




(a) Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (b) of this Section and in
Section 431, it is unlawful for any person,
persons, firm or corporation to sell tickets
for baseball games, football games, hockey
games, theatre entertainments, or any other
amusement for a price more than the price
printed upon the face of said ticket, and
the price of said ticket shall correspond
with the same price shown at the box office
or the office of original distribution.
(b) This Act does not apply to the sale
of tickets of admission to a sporting event,
theater, musical performance, or place of
public entertainment or amusement of any
kind for a price in excess of the printed
box office ticket price by a ticket broker
who meets all of the following requirements. 2
This part of the statute lays forth a general
prohibition against selling tickets for more than face
value, but creates an exception for licensed ticket
brokers who comply with certain statutory
formalities.
33
The third part of the statute creates a cause
of action for those who pay more than face value
for tickets and establishes a statutory damage award
of $ 100 for each ticket purchased in excess of face
value.
34
The legislative history of theTicket Scalping
Act indicates that its purpose is to "prevent 'ticket
scalpers' from purchasing large blocks of tickets for
the best seats at sporting and entertainment events
and then reselling those tickets to the public at
exorbitant prices. 3" Consequently, the state has
upheld the constitutionality of the Ticket Scalping
Act against challenges that it is an improper
delegation of legislative power and that it is an
impermissible piece of special legislation.16 The
court held that a rational basis supported theTicket
Scalping Act because the public welfare would be
furthered by protecting the public from "exorbitant
prices" charged by the stereotypical ticket scalper.1
7
Illinois is not alone in regulating ticket sales;
twenty-two other states impose price controls on
ticket sales while three states simply have location
controls that exclude scalping within the vicinity
of the entertainment venue. Five states have
enabling statutes that allow municipalities to draft
their own statutes to regulate ticket scalping. 8



















gaining momentum as states attempt to protect
the public's access to the free market."4 Various
courts, including the Illinois court, recognize a
legitimate government interest in protecting the
public's access to entertainment events by
regulating ticket scalping.
4'
Ill. Application of the
Statute to the Cubs' Lawsuit
A. Parties' rguments
At first glance, the statute indicates that the
owners and operators of ball clubs cannot charge
above face value for tickets and that the only entities
permitted to sell above face value are licensed ticket
brokers. The plaintiffs' attorney argued that
"l The court held that a rational basis sup-
ported the Ticket Scalping Act because
the public welfare would be furthered
by protecting the public from "exorbi-
tant prices" charged by the stereotypi-
cal ticket scalper. 9
A Whole Different BaDigame
Premium is illegal because "there's no practical
distinction between the broker and the Cubs. The




unlawful for it to sell
or permit the sale of By placing
Cubs tickets at
prices in excess of posed to le
the Lawful Price.' ' 42  the Cubs
(Emphasis included in
original.) Since the ets above f
statute prohibits




sale above face value
if Premium and the
Cubs are the same entity.
Paul M. Bauch, the plaintiffs' attorney, further
contended that Wrigley Field is but a "shell
corporation" designed by the Cubs to get around
state law.43 The plaintiffs argued that Premium was
in noncompliance with the Ticket Scalping Act since
the Cubs did not legitimately sell the tickets to
Premium. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that
the overlap in corporate structure between
Premium and the Cubs should lead the court to
disregard their technical separation and treat them
as the same entity.' By placing tickets with Premium
as opposed to legitimately purchasing them, the Cubs
were essentially selling tickets above face value in
violation of the Ticket Scalping Act.45 As to the
claims under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act and Uniform Deceptive trade
Practices Act, the plaintiffs alleged that the Cubs
engaged in a "bait and switch advertising
scheme... [by] advertising Cubs tickets at face value,
and then allegedly switch[ing] the consumers to
Premium's higher priced tickets by artificially limiting
the supply of Cubs tickets in the marketplace.
'46
The Cubs organization maintained that
Premium did not violate the Ticket Scalping Act. It
claimed that it was a licensed ticket broker that
satisfied the requirements enumerated in the Illinois
Ticket Scalping Act.47 Additionally, the Cubs
organization maintained that the tickets sold at
Premium were tickets that were otherwise
unavailable to regular Cubs fans because they come
from a pool of VIP tickets reserved for sponsors
and employees.48 At trial, Frank Maloney, the Cubs'
director of ticket operations testified that McGuire
tickets with Premium as op-
gitimately purchasing them,
vere essentially selling tick-
ace value in violation of the
ping Act.
instructed him "to reduce the size of the [VIP] pool
and sell the difference toWrigley Premium. '49 Klenk
stated, "Premium buys its tickets from the Cubs
and pays for them through intercompany transfer at
Tribune Co."" °
Premium also argued that it is a licensed
ticket broker within the ambit of theTicket Scalping
Statute and that its actions are separate from those
of the Cubs organization since it is a distinct
organization."' Additionally, it provides a service to
Cubs fans who do not purchase tickets far in advance.
It also provides a superior product by offering lower
prices and guaranteeing the authenticity of the
tickets.12 Also, in offering tickets that are otherwise
unavailable for sale to the general public, Premium
argued that its ticket operation did not disadvantage
normal fans, since those fans would not normally
have access to those tickets.5 3 In fact, Premium
argued that the concerns of rival ticket brokers
who were losing revenue in the form of less tickets
sold and offering tickets at lower prices to stay
competitive with Wrigley Field actually motivated
the suit.
4
Judge Hall held that the Cubs and Premium
did not violate the Ticket Scalping Act, the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act, or the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
because the facts were "largely undisputed
SPORTS
regarding customers' access to Cubs tickets, and
the creation and operation of Premium.""5 In
outlining the Cubs' ticket sales practices, Judge Hall
concluded that the sales of tickets between the
Cubs and Premium comply with the Ticket Scalping
Act. 6 The Cubs testified that season ticket holders
and group purchasers were typically able to
purchase tickets before the general public.5 7 As
benefits to these purchasers, season ticket holders
could return tickets for rained out games and group
purchasers could return ten percent of purchased
tickets ten days prior to the day of the game. 8 After
season ticket and group sales, other consumers
could purchase tickets at the box office starting
on the public on-sale date. 9 However, aside from
the tickets that are sold, the Cubs "hold back about
four to five thousand tickets per game in
reserve.. .allocated to organizations such as game
sponsors, opposing teams, the media, elected officials,
and employees. '6' Forty-eight hours before the
game, any unused reserve tickets are released for
sale to the general public and are available at the
Cubs' box office.6 "The tickets Premium
purchased from Ball Club for resale were tickets
Ball Club historically held in reserve... Premium was
able to obtain these tickets before the on-sale day.
62
Judge Hall held that Premium met the statutory
requirements of the Ticket Scalping Act because it
operated from a fixed location, displayed its broker
registration, maintained a list of its employees' names
and addresses, paid amusement taxes, and complied
with the statute's advertising and consumer
protection requirements.
63
Although Premium and the Cubs are both
subsidiaries of theTribune CompanyJudge Hall also
found no defects with Premium's corporate
structure. 4 She noted that Premium and the Cubs
shared corporate officers, Premium's officers were
initially on the Cubs payroll, the Cubs paid for some
of Premium's invoices, and that the Cubs provided
Premium with advice, assistance, and free advertising
time. 6 1 Premium testified that its finances are
operated through the Finance Service Center of
the Tribune Company in a manner analogous to that
of other Tribune subsidiaries, where the Service
Center acts as the subsidiaries' bank, maintaining
accounts for each and crediting and debiting their
accounts accordingly.66 Premium also has inter-
company accounts with other Tribune subsidiaries,
such as the ball club, through which it transfers
funds. 67 The Court found that the use of inter-
company accounts was a standard business
practice used to increase efficiency and reduce
fraud.
68
Premium stated that when it purchased
reserve tickets from the Cubs, the transactions
were recorded on both companies' inter-company
accounts. In 2003, Premium purchased $402,700
worth of tickets from the Cubs, which was
recorded as a debit to Premium and a credit for
the Cubs.69 Premium was allowed to sell back ten
percent of its tickets ten days prior to game day
under a policy that is identical to the one for group
sales purchasers.7 ° In 2002, Premium purchased
$1,047,766 worth of tickets from the Cubs and
was allowed to sell 90 percent of the tickets back
to the Cubs (in contrast to the group sales policy),
but mostly did so more than 48 hours prior to the
game (the same time when unused reserve seats
are released in the box office).7'
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the
court held that the defendants did not violate the
Ticket Scalping Act because the ticket transactions
between Premium and the Cubs were sales. The
court stated that, to prove a sale, "there must be
evidence of the transfer of ownership for a
price.. .when money is paid or a debt is recorded
at the time of sale, ownership transfers, the buyer
assumes the benefits and risks of ownership, and
the buyer sets the price and conditions for resales "'7"
As evidence of the sale, the court noted that inter-
company accounts were standard practices in
recording business transactions, that transfer of
ownership was evidenced by ticket statements from
the Cubs to Premium, the Cubs paid amusement
taxes when tickets were sold to Premium, and that
Premium undertook the risks and benefits of ticket
ownership (that Premium incurred losses for
unsold tickets and had a similar return policy to
group sales in 2003)." 3 Judge Hall held that the
2002 return of 90 percent of the tickets "does not
prove that a sale did not occur" and that the "Ball
Club had discretion to allow returns under
circumstances it determined were special."74
As to the plaintiffs' arguments that the
Cubs placed tickets with Premium and shared in
the excess revenue, the court stated, "plaintiffs
presented no evidence that Ball Club has an
arrangement with Premium whereby Ball Club
directly or indirectly shares in the excess over face
value which Premium receives upon reselling
tickets."75 As to concerns about the Cubs and
A Whole Different Bailgame
Premium's common ownership, the court further subsidiaries or advantages they devise from that
noted,
If indirect sharing is to be assumed because
of the common ownership of Premium and
Ball Club byTribune Co., then the legislature
could prohibit common ownership
outright, or prohibit Ball Club from selling
tickets to a broker also owned by a

















The court quickly disposed of the Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act by
finding that Premium did not engage in any deception
concerning its independence from the Cubs and that
it had not engaged in any bait and switch advertising
tactics that would violate the statute.78 Also, the
court found that Premium did not artificially limit
the market for tickets since it purchased relatively
small numbers of tickets and since its tickets came
out of the reserve pool that is otherwise unavailable
to fans.79 For similar reasons, the court found for
the defendants on the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act claim, holding that the plaintiffs failed
to prove bait and switch tactics, failed to prove a
diminished opportunity to buy tickets, and failed
to prove that they were confused as to whether




Judge Hall articulated concerns over the
common ownership of Premium and the Cubs
when she stated,"Should the public have a concern
about the common ownership of an amusement
and a licensed ticket broker, the relationship of the
relationship, then, the legislature can do the public's
bidding by enacting desired limitations.'8' Despite
the court's ruling that Premium has abided with the
letter of the Ticket ScalpingAct, the close association
between it and the Cubs is problematic.
In casting Premium as largely identical to
other ticket brokers, the court has overlooked the
consequences and advantages of common
ownership. The court declared, "Ticket brokers
purchase tickets in the same way as any customer;
from the Box Office, from Tickets.com, from a
season ticket holder or from other ticket brokers.
Premium is one of those ticket brokers." (Emphasis
added)82 However, Premium's tickets are purchased
from the Cubs reserve ticket supply, a luxury that is
not available to other non-Tribune affiliated ticket
brokers. 3 Were it not for the Cubs selling reserve
tickets to Premium, according to the Cubs' ticket
sales practices, the unused reserve tickets would
otherwise be released for sale at the box office 48
hours prior to the game (and thus become available
to patrons of the Box Office, fans, and competing
tickets brokers alike). The Cubs' sale of reserve
tickets to Premium decreases the fans' likelihood
of obtaining these tickets at face value.
The 2002 return of 90 percent of the unused
tickets is another example of preferential treatment
that Premium receives in relation to other ticket
purchasers. While the Cubs have since amended
Premium's return policy to limit returns to ten
percent of unused tickets, the 90 percent return that
was permitted in 2002 was far more generous than
the group sale policy of allowing ten percent returns.
While abiding by the requirements of the
Ticket Scalping Act, Premium's privileged position
relative to other ticket brokers (i.e., having exclusive
access to selling reserve seats more than 48 hours
In casting Premium as largely identical
to other ticket brokers, the court has
overlooked the consequences and ad-
vantages of common ownership!
SPORTS
before the game and benefiting from a generous
ticket return policy) decreases the number of tickets
that fans can purchase at face value and allows
increased revenue to inure to the benefit of Premium
and Tribune Co. Judge Hall's finding that Premium's
ticket operations do not cause the Cubs to directly
or indirectly benefit from the sale of ticket above
face value seems dubious. In maintaining that
Premium abided by the letter of the statute, and in
refusing to disregard the corporate separateness of
Premium and the Cubs, the court has permitted
Premium and the Cubs to skirt legislative intent.
Ticket scalping legislation was enacted and upheld
as a legitimate government interest in protecting the
public from "exorbitant prices" charged by the
stereotypical ticket scalper.
8 4
TheTicket ScalpingAct negotiates a delicate
balance between allowing event promoters to
extract maximum revenue from tickets and enabling
affordable access to events. In upholding the legality
of Premium's actions, the court is essentially
permitting the Cubs and Premium to exploit their
The Cubs have their hu
brokers have their hi
there's no solution to prc
who just wanted to get
playoff game.
access and information concerning tickets to the
public's detriment in a way that other ticket brokers
cannot. Judge Hall's statements that Premium is
similarly situated to other ticket brokers are
incorrect. Premium has exclusive access to reserve
tickets, unlike other ticket brokers, and the
secondary market is not a level playing field. If courts
are going to uphold the validity of team-affiliated
ticket brokerages, the legislature should either
prohibit teams from granting their brokerages
exclusive access to tickets (and force them to obtain
tickets just like any other ticket broker by
purchasing them from season ticket holders or on
the public on sale date) or it should give other ticket
brokers equal access to reserve seats to ensure
that other (non-Premium) secondary ticket brokers
are part of a free market.
D. Public Reaction to the Ticket
Brokerage Case
Although the court upheld the legality of
Premium as a separate entity, fan reaction has been
negative, as fans feel that "tickets they could buy at
face value are taken out of the market. "s Though
the Cubs and Premium describe Premium as a
service and a benefit to Cubs fans, the fans, as well
as sportswriters and theatre owners, are skeptical
of this benefit. Sports columnist Tom Cushman
wrote,"On Nov. 24, Judge Sophia Hall ruled that the
Cubs had done nothing illegal. She apparently didn't
address the morality issue:'86 Ron Stern, a theatre
manager in Chicago stated, "The Cubs have their
hustle and the brokers have their hustle.. .And
there's no solution to
protect the guy who
just wanted to get
into a Cubs playoff
stle and the game." 87
The negative press
ustle... And and fan reaction may
far outweigh the)tect the guy economic benefits




was to get through
the initial PR hit of
owning Premium,
then get involved
with other Chicago teams to scalp their tickets
too."8 9 Newspaper columnists have made the
Cubs a frequent target of criticism, highlighting the
plight of loyal working class fans who have waited
long hours in line or on the phone without being
able to obtain Cubs tickets at face value.90 In
painting a picture of loyal, blue-collar fans being
exploited by the Cubs' organization, the media has
transformed the ticket brokering controversy into
a public relations disaster, damaging the club's
reputation of good will and fairness.
While the fans may be the most sympathetic
parties in the Cubs controversy, Premium also
A Whole Different Ballgame
adversely affects other parties, such as Major League
Baseball ("MLB") and other ticket brokers. Since
the Cubs are required to give 30 percent of their
ticket revenues to MLB, the Cubs may be giving 30
percent of the face value to MLB while its parent
company keeps the rest of the ticket sales revenue
when they sell the tickets above face value. 9' In
keeping the extra revenue, and effectively redirecting
revenue that would have gone to MLB, the Cubs
have subverted the league's revenue sharing system,
which purportedly enables smaller-market teams to
remain competitive with larger market teams.92 The
plaintiffs' attorney, Paul M. Bauch, predicted that
Premium's court victory could translate into similar
practices by other
ball clubs. He said,"I
think what you're
going to see, basically,
is other sports S Public rea
franchises, in effect, kerage ha
doing their own
scalping, which is in part be(
basically promoting
tickets at one price, the Cubs
and then, in effect, sides of th
shorting the market,










undercutting the ticket market and utilizing the
club's access to information to exploit consumers.
As one ticket broker responded, "the Cubs' entry
into the secondary market creates an uneven playing
field for other brokers because they control the
product-the tickets that everybody wants."'94 The
Cubs' contention that Premium is just another
ticket broker has not been well received. One
economist has stated, "The Cubs' brokering firm
has much more access to information about the
supply of tickets than other brokers do.To suggest
that the Cubs' brokerage is just one more licensed
broker in the industry and therefore brings more
competition is just a misstatement of reality."9 In
leveraging its increased information into higher
ticket prices, Premium has subverted the legislative
intent of protecting the public from exorbitant fees.
The widespread public reaction to the
Chicago Cubs' case indicates that fans at least
distinguish Premium from other unaffiliated ticket
brokers. While reaction towards ticket brokering
can be characterized as generally negative, it is often
condoned as the operation of free enterprise.
96
Proponents of scalping assert "[t]here is no need to
regulate [a scalper's] prices, even if they seem
excessive, because the readjustment process would
be left to the market correction mechanism. If
consumers deem [a scalper's] prices to be
ction towards the Cubs' bro-
s been especially negative,
:ause of the perception that
have been "playing both
e fence" in terms of distrib-
ets at face value and also
ting those values in the sec-
3ale market through its bro-
unreasonable, they have the freedom to purchase
goods from another less expensive merchant and
the market place would remain the soundest
determination of price limits."97 However, public
reaction towards the Cubs' brokerage has been
especially negative, in part because of the perception
that the Cubs have been "playing both sides of the
fence" in terms of distributing tickets at face value
and also manipulating those values in the secondary
resale market through its brokerage.
Traditional economic analysis often conflicts
with price control regulations such as anti-scalping
statutes.98 However, if the fair market value of a
ticket is whatever the public is willing to pay, what




and the negative reaction towards theWrigley Field
Premium brokerage? In looking at the negative
reaction towards the Premium brokerage, what are
alternative methods by which promoters can sell
their tickets for prices closer to that which the
market will bear?
IV. Fairness as z Factor in
Shaping the Contents and
Effects of Law
As standard economic principles dictate,
"[A]II human behavior can be viewed as involving
participants who (I) maximize their utility (2) from
a stable set of preferences and (3) accumulate an
optimal amount of information and other inputs in a
variety of markets."9 9 A "principle of conventional
law and economics is that 'resources tend to
gravitate toward their most valuable uses' as markets
drive out any unexploited profit opportunities. ' 00
Price restraints and restraints on market
transactions such as ticket brokering seem
antithetical to allowing goods to reach their
maximum value.
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler explain the
existence of price limiting legislation, such as anti-
scalping statutes, by positing a behavioral economics
approach that incorporates perceptions of fairness
into the content and effects of law:' 0'
"[C]onventional economic analyses assume as a
matter of course that the excess demand for a good
creates an opportunity for suppliers to raise prices"
and that"[t]he profit-seeking adjustments that clear
the market are as natural as water finding its level-
and as ethically neutral," but "[t]he lay public does
not share this indifference."02 The authors explain
that the existence of market bans on transactions in
contravention to market principles is due to people's
perceptions of fairness and legislators' response to
their constituents.'
0 3
In their analysis, the authors define "fairness"
in relation to a"'reference transaction'-a transaction
that defines the benchmark for the parties'
interactions.... [I]f the parties are a consumer and
a firm in the market, the 'reference transaction' is a
transaction on the usual terms for the item in
question*"' °4 Selling tickets in excess of the face
value is a transaction that deviates from such a
"reference transaction." Furthermore,"[b]ehavioral
analysis predicts that if trades are occurring
frequently in a given jurisdiction at terms far from
those of the reference transaction, there will be
strong pressure for a law banning such trades."''0
The authors state
that, since the face






public perceives it as
unfair and prohibited
even though it makes
economic sense. 106
The authors
cite a study in which
tickets were to be
allocated either by an
auction, in which the individual who was willing to
pay the most would obtain tickets, or by awarding
tickets to people who had waited in line the
longest.' '7 The subjects of the study indicated they
thought tickets should be allocated to those who
waited in line the longest, as opposed to those who
was willing to pay more for them. 08 The results of
the study suggest that people remain tied to the
idea of the face value of the ticket being its fair
value, and that they value investments of time in
acquiring tickets over the willingness to pay more
money in obtaining tickets. The pervasiveness of
the notion that face value of a ticket is its fair value
seems to account as a factor in explaining the
existence of anti-scalping laws.
bb The results of the study suggest that people
remain tied to the idea of the face value of
the ticket being its fair value, and that they
value investments of time in acquiring tick-
ets over the willingness to pay more money
in obtaining tickets. 9
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Consequently, the existence and effects of
anti-scalping legislation shape promoters' responses
towards ticket pricing. Most promoters generally
recognize that "there is a strong public relations
argument" against raising ticket prices.'09 Major
sports associations, such as the National Basketball
Association ("NBA") and MLB, have recognized that
the reputation costs of dramatically raising ticket
prices for events are more damaging than the value
of the increased revenue from sales at higher prices.
In turn,the NBA and MLB"specify limits on the prices
that home teams can charge for the NBA finals or
the World Series so that the proper image of the
leagues can be maintained and future sales do not
suffer."' ' In maintaining prices below the amount
that can be obtained on the market, promoters foster
goodwill amongst their consumers, generating
greater profits in the long run.' Put another way,
"[c]harging what the market will bear in the short
run generates extremely adverse 'moral effects' or
'reputation effects' in the long run. Because of
consumer perceptions about fairness and moral
treatment, below-market pricing [and presumably
ticket-scalping regulation] continues."''
A~. Mstng s g WH~gey Fed~
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Although the existence of anti-scalping
legislation can be explained by perceptions of fairness,
and its popularity is increasingly being embraced by
courts, such legislation does not completely capture
the animosity engendered by the Premium ticket
brokering attempt.
Premium can be distinguished from other
ticket brokers by its association with the Cubs
organization. Premium's close ties with the Cubs'
organization, along with the "inter-company transfer"
of VIP tickets that are only made available to the
public via Premium, could indicate that the Cubs are
using their increased information and control of
distribution of tickets to exploit the secondary ticket
market to the disadvantage and chagrin of other
ticket brokers and consumers." 3 The "free market"
concept espoused by ticket brokers and resellers
only works to the extent that access to tickets is
equally divided between regular consumers and
ticket brokers. Although the context of the following
comments concern commercial bribery between
promoters and ticket brokers, they are equally
applicable to Premium's situation: "There cannot
be a free market when the price of a product is
controlled at the original point of distribution by a
conspiracy based on [bribery]. This results in access
to the product (tickets) for only a limited number
of people who are known to each other and who
determine the price that has to be paid for a ticket
in excess of the printed price."' 4 Similarly, in
Premium's situation, the price of the tickets on the
secondary market is controlled at the same place
where the original face value for the tickets is
determined and the resale prices are often higher
than the face value of the ticket. Although the Cubs
contend that only a small number of VIP tickets are
diverted to Premium, it still has the effect of denying
the public access to tickets they may have otherwise
been able to obtain at face value, since, unused
reserve tickets could otherwise have been placed
at the box office 48-hours prior to the game.
As a result of the connections between
Premium and the Cubs, the public perceives
unfairness in the form of unequal access to face value
tickets. As Happel and Jennings explain,"if the public
perceives that promoters are controlling or rigging
not only initial sales but also the resale market, or if
box-office employees are in league with scalpers to
acquire choice seats, reaction is likely to be strong. ""'
They elaborate further on the perception of a free
market
The public's concept of a free market
traditionally does not cover those who
obtain access or information by means not
available to everyone.An analogy is the harsh
sanctions against insider trading in securities.
Anyone can spend the time and money to
research a security and the offering company,
but not everyone would have access to a
lawyer at a firm that handles the company's
security offerings. Insider access is the line
of demarcation for public policy in free-
market regulation. Anyone can spend the
time to stand in line for tickets or pay the
funds to hire others to do so or run ads
seeking tickets, but not everyone can gain
access to a promoter or a box-office
employee. Regulators thus must respond
in some way to the public policy concern of
the level playing field perceived to be lost if
insider control of the secondary market is
permitted.' 16
In analogizing the Cubs-Premium
connection to that of an insider-trading relationship,
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Happel and Jennings characterize the public's
negative reaction as a response to an asymmetry of
information. Since Premium benefits from the Cubs'
increased information concerning ticket sales, the
secondary resale market for tickets is no longer
comparable to a free market; one party possesses
significantly more information than other parties,
such as non-Premium ticket brokers and the
consumers themselves. In suspecting the
transparency of this altered market, according to
Happel and Jennings, the negative public reaction is
due in part to the Cubs' failure to respond to the
In turn, public distrust an
tion might make the Wrigl
mium ticket brokerage ft
able in terms of damage
and lost sales than the Cu
anticipated.
"public policy concern of the level playing field
perceived to be lost."' 7
In asserting that Premium's ticket source
came from a vaguely defined "VIP pool," perhaps
the Cubs have not provided enough disclosure or
assurance to the public that Premium's sales did not
come at the expense of face value sales. In turn,
public distrust and dissatisfaction might make the
Wrigley Field Premium ticket brokerage far less
profitable in terms of damaged reputation and lost
sales than the Cubs originally anticipated.' 8 To dispel
the perception that Premium is benefiting unfairly
from its association with the Cubs, legislators should
give other ticket brokers equal access to the Cubs
reserve pool or prohibit Premium from enjoying the
benefits of its association with the Cubs (e.g., force
Premium to buy its tickets from the same sources
available to other non-Cub affiliated brokers
consisting of season ticket holders and tickets
available as of the public on-sale date).
B. Other Methods of Ticket Pricing
In the wake of ticket scalping legislation, the
presence of ticket brokers, and public perceptions
of insider trading, promoters strive to achieve a
delicate balance when determining ticket prices and
making decisions concerning secondary resale
markets. The secondary resale market for tickets
will continue to exist as long as tickets are sold in
advance.'' 9 When tickets are sold in advance, people
who desire to buy tickets may not be able to wait in
line for tickets or may
prefer to pay a ticket
reseller in exchange
for staying in line;d dissatisfac- people who purchase
ley Field Pre- tickets may not be
able to attend the
ir less profit- event and will instead
transfer their ticketsd reputation to other people, or
bs originally people may not enter
the market for tickets
until time is close to
the event. '12 The
Cubs themselves
stated that Premium
evolved after they watched the ticket brokers make
money off their face-value tickets.'2 ' Other sports
franchise owners have expressed similar
dissatisfaction in seeing ticket scalpers profit off the
market demand for tickets, reflecting the idea that
tickets at face value are priced below market value
when scalpers are able to sell them for more than
face value.' 22 In response to scalpers' profit, many
sports clubs have instituted pricing strategies that
attempt to more accurately reflect the market
demand for tickets while taking into account the
concern for public accessibility.
One approach is for clubs to try to gauge
the primary ticket market more accurately in order
to decrease the amount of secondary resale by
ticket brokers.12 1 If promoters can more accurately
gauge the value of its tickets to its fans, then the
need for ticket brokers may be decreased if those
fans are offered the tickets they desire at the prices
they want.' 24 In the past the Cubs held back some
of their bleacher seats for day of game sales at the
box office, enabling fans to buy tickets at face value
at a relatively short time before the game. '2 Frank
Maloney, Cubs' director of ticket sales, stated that
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this method of ensuring public access to tickets
was a poor business model because it forced the
club to assume the risk of unsold seats. 26 With
uncertainties such as the weather and the ever-
changing popularity of the club on any given day,
Cubs' officials decided it was not economically
sound to continue to allocate tickets in this manner.
Clubs including the Cubs have capitalized
on changing circumstances by instituting variable
ticket pricing. Analogous to the ticket pricing
strategies for Broadway shows and airline tickets,
variable ticket pricing,
also called "scaling the
house," is a method
in which "teams (
charge more for In the au
popular games in mid
and late season, on reference
weekends, and against w'hich to
marquee opponents.
It charges less for less fairness;
attractive midweek h
or early season themselv





the date of the game or the opponent. 28 In 1999,
the Colorado Rockies were the first team in MLB
to institute a system of variable ticket pricing by
implementing a two-tiered pricing system for each
individual seat based on factors, including the date
of the game and the opponent. 29 The Rockies'
system has since "evolved into a multi-tiered
program that compounds the extra charges for the
best games."' 30 Other teams use a less complicated
approach to variable ticket pricing, such as reduced
ticket prices earlier in the season or for midweek
games.' 3 ' Nearly half of MLB's teams currently
institute some form of variable ticket pricing.
2
Variable ticket pricing attempts to "tie the
cost of a ticket directly to consumer demand."' 33
In targeting pricing to reflect consumer demand,
Mets' senior vice president David Howard noted,
"[I]t's all peak versus off-peak pricing. It's a wasted
asset if you don't use it.'' 34 The push for increasing
ticket revenues has been tied in part to decreases in
ballpark attendance and the league's revenue sharing
plan. 3 Additionally, some clubs have been able to
use variable ticket pricing as a means of subsidizing
other games, enabling clubs to offer more games at
a lower cost.'3 6 Teams have made different
decisions regarding whether variable ticket pricing
should be applied to season ticket holders, for fear
of alienating these important consumers."'
Fan reaction towards variable ticket pricing
has been mixed. Some fans view it as exploitative
price gouging, while others are content to pay a
premium to see games against marquee opponents
on the days of their choosing.3 8 In spite of the mixed
reactions, variable ticket pricing is not a perfect
-tion situation, there is no
transaction or face value on
base perceived notions of
instead, the consumers
s determine the value of the
answer in assessing ticket demands. The promoter
still suffers from a lack of information, which prevents
him from charging the same price that the market
will bear. 9
In an attempt to better approximate ticket
prices, the Seattle Mariners conducted an
experimental ticket-pricing scheme in which the
team used an Internet real-time auction using fan
demand to dictate the ticket prices for three
games. 140 The Mariners created an online
marketplace where the price of tickets was tied to
consumer demand; fans could visit the website and
see the current going rate for tickets. 4 ' They could
either purchase at that price or indicate a lower
reservation price, at which the tickets would
automatically be purchased should the price fall to
that level.'42 Without disclosing specific numbers,
the club indicated that its ticket revenue had been
higher than the revenue it would have obtained had
it sold the tickets for face value. 43 Economist
Werner Reinartz has indicated that the Mariners'
attempt at dynamic ticket pricing did not violate
perceptions of fairness in that ticket prices did not
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change between customers, but that they changed
over time, much like they would in a stock market.'
In being open with consumers about the nature of
ticket pricing and transparently allowing them to
determine the prices of ticket, the perceived fairness
concerns cited by Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler are no
longer an impediment to perceived fairness. In the
auction situation, there is no reference transaction
or face value on which to base perceived notions of
fairness; instead, the consumers themselves
determine the value of the ticket.
While the Seattle Mariners' experiment
functioned as a more precise example of tying ticket
prices to consumer demand than variable ticket
pricing, it has not caught on as a widely used
mechanism for pricing tickets. Although it does tie
ticket prices to consumer demand, it presents the
same problems as brokerages-i.e., enabling those
who are willing to pay more access to tickets.4 The
dynamic pricing does not resolve the problem of
ensuring affordable public access to events.
Additionally, dynamic ticket pricing does not fully
address the concerns of the secondary resale
market. While having consumers determine the
prices they want to pay for tickets may result in
fewer fans reselling their tickets, the secondary resale
market will still persist for the same reasons that it
currently does; people are unwilling to spend time
to bid for tickets, people buy tickets but are later
unable to use them, and fans may not realize that
they want tickets until it is too late to bid.
46
One company has combined the pricing
mechanism of an auction with the authenticity
guarantee that Premium offers. Stubhub is a ticket
auction service that allows buyers and sellers to
mingle in the marketplace and, through free
negotiation, arrive at a price that reflects the true
value of a ticket. 147 As commission, Stubhub collects
I5 percent of the ticket price from the seller and
ten percent from the buyer.'48 Stubhub's authenticity
guarantee offers consumers either the tickets they
ordered or comparable tickets purchased by the
company.'49 Unlike other auctions, such as eBay,
Stubhub's authenticity guarantee may encourage
those who are fearful of being defrauded to use ticket
auctions.
The company was created because "The
market, in business-speak, lacked liquidity. It was
highly fragmented. Buyers and sellers had a hard
time finding each other. Information was scarce,
fraud was rampant and pricing was distorted. Two
buyers sitting side by side at a basketball playoff might
have paid wildly different prices for what was,
essentially, the same product."'5 ° Stubhub seeks to
remedy a lack of information with a centralized
forum, allowing for a common meeting ground and
a more accurate reflection of a ticket's real worth.
Assuming that teams have not engaged in
undercutting the supply of face-value ticket
themselves, one approach to regulate the secondary
ticket market is to restrict scalping to a specific area,
making it illegal to scalp tickets in any other area
than the designated area. Such an approach was
used in Phoenix, Arizona, to regulate scalping during
the 1995 NBA All-Star Game.' When the sellers
were in a designated area, and it was legal to sell tickets
above face value without a license, potential buyers
could more easily compare prices between scalpers,
which is something they otherwise had difficulty
doing. 5 2 The Phoenix free-market atmosphere
created a competitive pricing atmosphere, reducing
the amount of scalpers who were able to procure
since the open market allowed customers to
comparison-shop among different ticket vendors.5 3
While Happel and Jennings have pushed this idea
further, to suggest the implementation of a system
in which tickets are traded on a futures market, the
impetus of their observation is that market-based
approaches to ticket-scalping may function better
to balance the protection of consumers with the
toleration of the secondary resale market since such
an approach would result in smaller economic
profits for scalpers as a result of competitive
pressures and greater open-market access. 1
4
However, this model of regulating ticket scalping
would only be effective if all ticket brokers had equal
access and information concerning ticket distribution
(i.e., that there isn't a brokerage like Premium that
has continuing exclusive access to good seats).
In balancing the interest in affordable public
access to sporting events with the promoters' and
ticket brokers' interest in extracting revenue from
the resale of tickets, it seems that promoters may
stand the best chance of maximizing revenue by more
accurately predicting the prices that consumers are
willing to pay in the primary market rather than risk
alienating their customers' notions of perceived
fairness by attempting to profit off of the secondary
resale market. As for ticket brokers and resellers in
the secondary market, assuming that such brokers
are equally situated in terms of access to tickets,
restriction of such sellers to a centralized location
may likely result in lower ticket prices obtained by
the resellers, which translates into more favorable
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results for fans who make use of the secondary
market.
The allegedly slight profits the Cubs gained
from the operation of Wrigley Field Premium are
likely outweighed by the damage of the public
relations backlash that has accompanied the Premium
trial. Baseball's history has certainly demonstrated
that it can overcome the effects of negative publicity.
Still, in light of the recent trends of decreased ballpark
attendance, the popularity of other sports, and other
forms of
entertainment, which
have forced MLB to
institute attention-
grabbing tactics such Promoters
as inter-league play,
the Cubs may have of maximi
picked an rately pre
inopportune time to
alienate their fans. sumers are
Limitations
on ticket brokering market rat
and scalping can be customers
explained as a
response to ness by at
perceptions of
fairness-that the secondary i
face value printed on
a ticket is its fair value.
Despite the
acknowledgment that
ticket brokers can operate within a free market
bounded by the limitations of the Ticket Scalping
Act, fan reaction to the trial has been negative
because fans' perceptions of fairness have been
further offended. Not only are tickets being sold
above face value, they are being sold by a brokerage
affiliated with the Cubs, which the public perceives
as having the capability to sell those same tickets at
face value. The public fears that the Cubs are
diverting tickets away from the supply to be sold at
face value, altering the market, and forcing fans to
purchase at higher prices from ticket brokers
(Wrigley Field Premium included). With the Cubs
brokering their own tickets, the market is no longer
transparent, and access to face-value tickets is
further impaired. While the Cubs attempted to
combat the criticism, by stating that Premium only
sold VIP tickets that were not otherwise available
to fans and that Premium sold only a very limited
number of tickets, the brokerage operation may be
unable to shake the taint of unfairness-regardless
of the decision of the Cook County Circuit Court.
Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler have noted that a
pure economic model based on self- interest is
inadequate to explain spiteful or kind behavior that
is not economically efficient.' 5 Perceived notions
of fairness sometimes override the desire for profit.
As they explain, "In many market and bargaining
settings, people care about being treated fairly and
want to treat others fairly if those others are
themselves behaving fairly. As a result of these
concerns, the agents in a behavioral economic model
are both nice and (when they are not treated fairly)
more spiteful than the agents postulated by a
neoclassical theory." ' 6 Also, as Chicago Sun-Times
columnist Greg Couch put it,"[T]he spirit of baseball
isn't supposed to be about technicalities. It's about
the fans... It's about the several fans who e-mailed
me to say they would like to sell their Cubs-Yankees
tickets at face value to Oscar Ruiz, a blue-collar Cubs
fan who spent the night in his car to get tickets, only
to be told they were sold out."'I' Jolls, Sunstein and
Thaler's theory explains the behavior of fans who
are willing to forego profit (since Premium was selling
those tickets in excess of face value) in order to
assure that someone who was behaving fairly (by
waiting for tickets) was being treated fairly (by
obtaining tickets at face value).
may stand the best chance
zing revenue by more accu-
dicting the prices that con-
willing to pay in the primary
her than risk alienating their
I notions of perceived fair-
tempting to profit off of the
,esale market. 9 9
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The reaction of sports fans who
sympathized with the ticketless, blue-collar fan
demonstrates the popular interest that baseball
tickets remain affordable and accessible for all fans,
even if they are not able to pay market price (e.g.,
ticket broker prices) for tickets. Perhaps the interest
in maintaining accessibility for baseball events is
particularly strong because of baseball's enduring
association with America and its goals of democracy
and egalitarianism. In order to accommodate the
interest in ensuring affordable public access to
baseball games, the Cubs could reconsider
implementing measures designed to keep prices
affordable. Various teams use methods such as game-
day sales, limiting the number of tickets that can be
purchased by a single buyer, and allocating playoff
tickets by lottery to ensure affordable access for
fans. Additionally, lobbying for laws that level the
playing field for all ticket brokers and put caps on
the surpluses that brokers can charge may also work
towards achieving that end.
In searching for a way to increase profits,
the Cubs ticket brokerage has alienated fans, causing
them to be distrustful of the organization. While
baseball teams are interested in generating more
profit, operating their own ticket brokerages and
giving them exclusive access to good seats does not
seem to be a good solution. One method for clubs
to increase revenues would be to institute variable
ticket pricing or auction systems in order to more
accurately gauge the market demand for tickets.
While raising prices is generally unpopular, this
method seems to engender less criticism than the
Wrigley Field scheme and allows clubs to use such
excess revenue to subsidize price reductions for
other games. Additionally, recognizing that the
secondary market will always continue to exist, fans
could lobby for legislation keeping baseball teams
from granting exclusive access to tickets to their
own brokerages. Baseball teams could lobby for laws
that restrict the locations of scalpers, such as the
Phoenix Suns' measure, allowing a free-market within
borders to allow fans greater access to knowledge
of market conditions, enabling them to pay lower
prices and minimize the profits enjoyed by scalpers.
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